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SUESZ V. MED-1 SOLUTIONS, LLC:
DEFINITION OF A JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN
THE VENUE REQUIREMENT OF THE
FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES
ACT
DANIEL MARK*
When a debt collector sues a debtor, the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act (FDCPA) requires the debt collector to file the suit in the same “judicial district” in which the debtor resides or where the contract giving rise
to the suit was signed. This applies to state law actions filed in state courts.
Normally this restriction is not an issue because state venue rules generally
require a defendant to be sued in the county in which the defendant lives.
And normally the courts in one county will not be construed as being more
than one judicial district. However, the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc,
held that the municipal department districts in Cook County, Illinois and
the township small claims courts in Marion County, Indiana constitute separate judicial districts within their respective counties for the purposes of
the FDCPA venue rule. This venue rule, as interpreted by the Seventh Circuit goes against the commonly understood meaning of “judicial district”
as it has been used by Congress. Further, this interpretation of the Act
functionally operates to impose federal venue rules on state law actions in
state courts—where venue rules are generally left to state discretion.

I.
II.

III.

INTRODUCTION…………………………………………84
BACKGROUND…………………………………………..86
A. NEWSOM V. FRIEDMAN…………….…….…………..86
B. HESS V. COHEN & SLAMOWITZ, LLPD…………….....89
C. SUESZ V. MED-1 SOLUTIONS, LLC I………………….92
SUESZ V. MED-1 SOLUTIONS, LLC EN BANC …………….94
A. MAJORITY OPINION………………………………...94

*

J.D. Candidate, May 2016, Northern Illinois University College of Law; B.A., Northern Illinois University. Notes and Comments Editor, Northern Illinois University Law Review. I would like to thank
Judge Raymond Mitchell for inadvertently providing me with a topic. Thank you to the board and editors of the Review for your work in preparing this piece. I would also like to thank Professors Parness
and Jones for their invaluable guidance.

83

84

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

IV.

V.

[Vol.

36

B. SYKES’S CONCURRENCE…………………………...98
C. FLAUM DISSENT……………………………………99
D. KANNE DISSENT…………………………………...100
ARGUMENT…………………………………………….103
A. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION………………………103
B. PRACTICAL INCONSISTENCIES……………………..104
C. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SUESZ RULE…………106
CONCLUSION…………………………………………..108
I.

INTRODUCTION

In light of congressional recognition of a growing trend in abusive
practices by unscrupulous debt collectors, Congress enacted the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).1 Congress intended the Act to combat
abusive debt collection tactics, to provide a uniform and consistent standard
for eliminating these practices across the states, and to attempt to even the
playing field for debt collectors who do not employ abusive tactics.2
In passing the Act, Congress included the Fair Trade Commission’s
“fair venue standards.”3 The Act specifically provides that when a debt collector brings a legal action against a debtor’s consumer debt, the debt collector shall bring such action “only in the judicial district or similar legal
entity . . . in which such consumer signed the contract sued upon; or . . . in
which such consumer resides at the commencement of the action.”4 This
provision was included in an effort to combat abusive forum-shopping practices whereby debt collectors would sue debtors in courts so inconvenient
or distant that the debtor would be very unlikely to appear—thereby allowing debt collectors to obtain default judgments.5 Congress provided in the
statute’s declaration of purpose that “[e]ven where abusive debt collection
practices are purely intrastate in character, they nevertheless directly affect
interstate commerce.”6 So, even actions wholly based upon state law, filed
in state courts, would have to comply with the venue provision of the
FDCPA.7 Interestingly, Congress failed to include a definition of “judicial
district or similar legal entity” from the definitions section of the Act; thus,
it has been left to courts to try to determine what a “judicial district or simi1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) (2014).
15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2014).
S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 40 (1977).
15 U.S.C. § 1692i (2014) (emphasis added).
S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 40 (1977).
15 U.S.C. § 1692(d) (2014).
See id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1692i (2014).
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lar legal entity” is.8 Penalties for failure to comply with the Act include: any
actual damage resulting from the debt collector’s failure to comply; additional damages for an individual not to exceed $1,000; the statute also provides for much larger recoveries for successful class actions; and for costs
and reasonable attorney’s fees when actions are found to have been brought
in bad faith or for the purpose of harassing a debtor.9
In July of 2014 the Seventh Circuit United States Court of Appeals issued an opinion after an en banc rehearing of Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions.10
The case concerned the interpretation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act’s venue provision as applied to the Marion County township courts.11
The court’s holding overturned the Seventh Circuit panel’s opinion for
Suesz and the Seventh Circuit’s Newsom v. Friedman opinion, the case on
which the Suesz panel based its holding.12 Prior to this decision, whether a
court constituted a “judicial district” under the venue provision of the
FDCPA had been based upon the actual composition and administration of
a given court system.13 The Seventh Circuit’s new approach defined “judicial district” under this Act as the “smallest geographic area that is relevant
for determining venue in the court system in which the case is filed.”14 This
new approach presents some interesting issues for how debt collection activities will now be forced to occur in certain “small claims” courts such as
in Cook County, Illinois and Marion County, Indiana.
Part II of this Note provides a comprehensive overview of the three
U.S. Circuit Court cases that addressed this issue prior to Suesz II. Newsom
v. Friedman is a Seventh Circuit case which dealt with the Cook County
Municipal Department Districts.15 Hess v. Cohen & Slamowitz is a Second
Circuit case that analyzed the meaning of “judicial district” under the
FDCPA as applied to a Syracuse, New York city court.16 The final background opinion in this Part is that filed by the Suesz I panel.
Part III provides a comprehensive overview of the Suesz II opinions.
There were four opinions written for this case. Judges Posner and Hamilton
wrote the majority opinion for this case. Judge Sykes wrote a concurring
opinion. Judges Flaum and Kanne wrote separate dissents from the majority
opinion.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a (2014).
15 U.S.C. § 1692k (2014).
Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 757 F.3d 636, 638 (7th Cir. 2014).
Id.
Id.
Newsom v. Friedman, 76 F.3d 813 (7th Cir. 1996).
Suesz, 757 F.3d at 638.
Newsom, 76 F.3d at 813.
Hess v. Cohen & Slamowitz, LLP, 637 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 2011).
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First, in Part IV, I will argue that in the majority’s statutory construction of the venue provision new definition of “judicial district” and corresponding rule espoused by the majority simply missed the point. Second, I
will argue that this rule leads to inconsistencies when actually put into practice. Finally, I will argue that while this rule does not mandate that states
change their procedural law to accommodate the decision, by imposing a
federal penalty on individuals acting within state court systems, pursuing
state law claims, and abiding by state procedural law, it violates the Tenth
Amendment and is unconstitutional.

II.
A.

INTERPRETATION OF § 1692i PRIOR TO SUEZ II

NEWSOM V. FRIEDMAN

Newsom v. Friedman was the Seventh Circuit’s first opportunity to analyze what a “judicial district” meant under the FDCPA.17 In Newsom,
Friedman, an attorney who specialized in debt collections, brought an action to recover unpaid medical bills that had been incurred at Elmhurst
Memorial Hospital, located in DuPage County.18 Newsom, the debtor, was
a resident of Schaumburg, Illinois, located in Cook County, and importantly
in the Third Municipal District.19 Friedman filed the lawsuit in the first municipal department of the Circuit Court of Cook County which is located in
the Daley Center, downtown Chicago.20 Friedman subsequently obtained a
default judgment against Newsom.21 When Friedman attempted to collect
on the judgment, Newsom initiated proceedings against him, claiming that
by Friedman’s failure to file the action against her in the Third Municipal
Department that he violated the venue provision of the FDCPA.22 Although
the district court determined that the phrase “judicial district” was ambiguous, it granted Friedman’s motion to dismiss, concluding that it had been
properly filed.23 Newsom’s subsequent appeal gave the Seventh Circuit its
first chance to determine what the meaning of a “judicial district” is under
the FDCPA.24
The Seventh Circuit was not convinced by the district court’s categorization of the phrase “judicial district” as ambiguous.25 Although the phrase
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Newsom, 76 F.3d at 813.
Id. at 815.
Id.
Id. at 815-16.
Id. at 815.
Newsom v. Friedman, 76 F.3d 813, 815 (7th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 815-16.
Id.
Id. at 817.
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“judicial district” was not defined in the statute, the court concluded that in
such an absence a word is usually construed in a way that gives it its natural
or ordinary meaning.26 In an instance such as this, the court held, legal
terms should be given their common law meaning.27 The court relied on the
definition of “judicial district” provided by Black’s Law Dictionary in order
to determine the phrase’s plain language meaning:
One of the circuits or precincts into which a state is
commonly divided for judicial purposes; a court of
general original jurisdiction being usually provided
in each of such districts, and the boundaries of the
district marking the territorial limits of its authority; or the district may include two or more counties, having separate and independent county
courts, but in that case they are presided over by
the same judge.28
After establishing the proper definition of a “judicial district,” the
Newsom court looked at the structure of Illinois State courts—specifically
looking to judicial circuits.29 Article VI, Section 7 of the Illinois Constitution provides:
The State shall be divided into Judicial Circuits consisting of one or more counties. The First
Judicial District shall constitute a Judicial Circuit.
The Judicial Circuits within the other Judicial Districts shall be as provided by law.30
Thus, under the Illinois Constitution, it is possible for one judicial circuit to be comprised of multiple counties, and in such a case there is one
Chief Judge that presides over the circuit.31 Further, the Circuit Courts,
when divided into divisions under Article VI section 7(c) possess original
jurisdiction, and “the divisions are not considered jurisdictional.”32 It was
clear to the court that based upon the Black’s definition, each Circuit Court
26. Id.
27. Newsom v. Friedman, 76 F.3d 813, 817 (7th Cir. 1996).
28. Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 848 (6th ed. 1990)) (which provides the
same definition for the phrase as the 4th edition which was the current edition when the
statute was passed in 1977).
29. Id. at 818.
30. Id. (quoting ILL. CONST. art. VI, §7).
31. Id.
32. Newsom v. Friedman, 76 F.3d 813, 818 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Bd. of Trs. of
Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 508 v. Rosewell, 635 N.E.2d 413, 429 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1992));
ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 7(c).

88

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.

36

constituted a judicial district; however, Newsom’s argument that each municipal department constituted a separate “judicial district” under the
FDCPA required further inquiry.33
To try to determine how the municipal department districts should be
categorized, the court looked to the Procedures and Rules of the Court of
the Circuit Court of Cook County that detailed the structure and rules for
the court system.34 This General Order describes what courts will hear what
types of cases, and further provides: “that civil actions be filed in . . . the
municipal department district of residence of any defendant, or . . . the municipal department district in which the transaction or some part thereof
occurred out of which the cause of action arose.”35 Thus, to this point, the
Cook County Court Rules reflect the same venue requirement as the
FDCPA.36 However, General Order 1.3 provides that:
[A]ny action may be assigned to any judge or associate judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County for
hearing or trial, regardless of the department, division or district in which the case was filed or to
which the judge is regularly assigned. Any action
or proceeding may be heard or tried in any courtroom in the Circuit Court of Cook County, regardless of the department, district or division in which
the case was filed or for which the courtroom is
regularly used.37
Under this rule then, the venue provision is really at the discretion of
the courts and cases may be transferred from one court to another merely
out of convenience. Further, even in the event that an action is filed in the
wrong court, that action could not be dismissed, nor could a judgment be
vacated merely because it was filed in the wrong court.38 The rules also
provide for the transfer of cases improperly filed and for the transfer of
cases based on convenience to the parties or for reasons of efficiency.39
It was important to the Newsom court that these rules govern all of the
municipal district departments, that there is one Chief Judge for the entire
Circuit, and that “the Circuit as a whole is the court of original jurisdiction
33. Newsom, 76 F.3d at 818.
34. Id.
35. Id.; GEN. ORDER OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK CTY., MUN. DEP’T. 1.2,
2.3(d)(1) (1996).
36. Newsom, 76 F.3d at 819.
37. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting GEN. ORDER OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK
CTY. MUN. DEP’T. 1.3(a) (1996).
38. Id. (citing GEN. ORDER 1.3(b) (1996)).
39. Id. (citing GEN. ORDER 1.3(c), (d) (1996)).
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for all of Cook County, and the boundaries between the Municipal Department administrative subdistricts do not set any territorial limits to the subdistrict’s authority within the Circuit.”40 Based upon this analysis, the court
concluded that municipal department districts do not constitute separate
judicial districts under the FDCPA.41
The Newsom court went on to describe how the plain meaning of judicial district was consistent with the purpose of the Act.42 The court explained that different state courts label their courts differently.43 Some states
might label their trial courts as district courts, similar to that of the federal
court system.44 Illinois, on the other hand, has chosen to label its trial courts
as circuit courts and its appellate courts as district courts.45 Thus, it seems
as though Congress, in drafting this statute, chose the phrase “judicial district” because that is how the federal court system labels its trial courts. 46
This language should be viewed to be consistent with the legislative purpose, and it would be inconsistent with the purpose of the statute if debt
collectors were able to ignore this provision just because of how that state
chose to label its courts.47
B.

HESS V. COHEN & SLAMOWITZ, LLP

The Second Circuit Court also considered what “judicial district or
similar legal entity” meant under the FDCPA’s venue provision in Hess v.
Cohen & Slamowitz, LLP.48 Cohen & Slamowitz brought a debt collection
suit against Hess in Syracuse City Court.49 Hess was successful in having
that case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Section 213 of New
York’s Uniform City Court Act due to none of the parties residing “in Syracuse or a town that was contiguous thereto by land.”50
This appeal followed the United States District Court for the Northern
District of New York’s dismissal of Hess’ complaint against Cohen &
Slamowitz, alleging a violation of the FDCPA’s venue provision, for filing
a debt collection action against him in the Syracuse City Court.51 The
Northern District Court based its dismissal on two grounds: First, that based
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Newsom v. Friedman, 76 F.3d 813, 819 (7th Cir. 1996).
Id.
Id. at 819-20.
Id. at 820.
Id.
See Newsom v. Friedman, 76 F.3d 813, 820 (7th Cir. 1996).
Id.
Hess v. Cohen & Slamowitz, LLP, 637 F.3d 117, 118 (2d Cir. 2011).
Id. at 119.
Id.
Id.
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on its analysis of the Second Circuit’s common law, the phrase “‘judicial
district’ meant ‘county.’”52 Second, the court did not believe that Cohen &
Slamowitz had filed the action against Hess “in Syracuse City Court . . .
‘intend[ing] to be unfair, harassing, and deceptive.’”53 With this in mind,
the court concluded that extending liability to Cohen & Slamowitz for having filed the suit in the Syracuse City Court would set a precedent that
would “impose undue restrictions on ethical debt collectors.”54
The Second Circuit then set out attempting to determine what “judicial
district or similar legal entity” means under the FDCPA.55 The Second Circuit, as did the Seventh Circuit in Newsom, first looked to dictionary definitions in place at the time the statute was enacted.56 The court also held that
when determining what the phrase “judicial district” means in the context
of a case filed in a state court system, courts must look to the structure of
that state’s courts.57 However, the court dismissed, without much discussion, that the phrase might have been meant by Congress to reflect “judicial
districts” in the context of the federal court system.58 In summarily dismissing this potential meaning, the court only considered that the venue provision could not have been written to mean that actions could be brought anywhere within a federal district—as those “tend to be ‘much larger than
correlative state units.’”59 The court failed to consider that Congress might
have meant that cases could be filed in any state court similar to its correlative federal district court.60
The court proceeded to analyze New York’s state court system structure.61 Under New York law, “the place of trial shall be in the county in
which one of the parties resided when it was commenced” and “the place of
trial shall be the residence of a defendant.”62 Here, the court noted that Cohen & Slamowitz did not bring their client’s case against Hess “in the Onondaga County branch of the supreme court; rather, it brought suit in the
city court for the City of Syracuse.”63 While New York’s Uniform City
Court Act does not specifically provide for venue, as previously noted,
Hess was able to have the underlying case dismissed on the basis of lack of
52. Id. at 119-20.
53. Hess v. Cohen & Slamowitz, LLP, 637 F.3d 117, 120 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting
Hess v. Cohen & Slamowitz, LLP, 2010 WL 60322, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2010)).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 120-21.
56. Id. at 121.
57. Id.
58. Hess v. Cohen & Slamowitz, LLP, 637 F.3d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 2011).
59. Id. (quoting Dutton v. Wolhar, 809 F.Supp. 1130, 1139 (D. Del. 1992)).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 121-22.
62. Id. at 122 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R § 503(a), (f) (McKinney 1981)).
63. Hess v. Cohen & Slamowitz, LLP, 637 F.3d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 2011).
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jurisdiction.64 Cohen & Slamowitz argued that the distinction between jurisdiction and venue is important—that jurisdiction is based on whether a
court can hear a case or compel a defendant, but venue is more related to
convenience of the parties.65 Cohen & Slamowitz’s complaint alleged a
number of connections that it believed Hess to have with the city of Syracuse, and therefore, venue would have been proper.66
The court held that since Cohen & Slamowitz chose to sue Hess in the
Syracuse city court, which is limited territorially by the “defendant’s contacts with the forum,” that for the purposes of the FDCPA’s venue provision “judicial district” in the context of these city courts must only extend
to the city in which the debtor resides and the “towns within the same county that are contiguous by land thereto.”67 Cohen & Slamowitz’s argument
with regard to the difference between jurisdiction and venue was unpersuasive to the court, as the court focused on the territorial aspect of Section 213
of the UCCA, and used that as the basis for its definition of “judicial district” under the FDCPA. The court was similarly not persuaded by Cohen &
Slamowitz’s argument that an FDCPA violation should not result because
under Section 213 of the Uniform City Court Act when a case is dismissed
based pursuant thereto the case may be re-filed in another city court that
can exercise jurisdiction.68 As the court noted, normally cases filed in an
improper venue would be dismissed with prejudice and the plaintiff would
be allowed to re-file.69
The court considered Newsom, but distinguished Hess from Newsom
based upon differences in the makeup of Cook County’s municipal department structure, and that of the City Courts in New York—specifically that
the municipal departments do not set territorial limits.70 Importantly, the
court noted that if Cohen & Slamowitz would have chosen to sue Hess in an
Onondaga County supreme court, then it would not have violated the
FDCPA and venue would have been proper regardless of which supreme
court in Onondaga County the case was filed.71

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 119.
Id.
Hess v. Cohen & Slamowitz, LLP, 637 F.3d 117, 124 (2d Cir. 2011).
Id.
Id. at 126-27.
Id. at 125.
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SUESZ V. MED-1 SOLUTIONS, LLC I

Med-1 Solutions is a company in the business of purchasing delinquent debts incurred from medical bills.72 Med-1 purchased the delinquent
debts owed by Mark Suesz from treatment he received at Community Hospital North in Indianapolis.73 In an attempt to collect on this debt, Med-1
filed an action against Suesz in the Marion County Small Claims Court for
Pike Township.74 Med-1 obtained a $1,280 judgment against Suesz.75 Suesz
filed suit against Med-1 in federal court, claiming that Med-1 violated the
venue provision of the FDCPA.76 Suesz’s theory was that Med-1 violated
the FDCPA by not filing the action in the small claims court in the Lawrence Township, where Community North Hospital was located, thus where
Suesz incurred the debt.77 At the time Med-1 brought the action against
Suesz, he did not reside in Marion County; rather he lived in a county adjacent to Marion.78 However, still at issue was whether “judicial district” as
applied to where the debt was incurred meant venue was proper in any
township court, or whether each township small claims court would be classified as a separate “judicial district” under the FDCPA.79 The federal district court relied on Newsom and dismissed Suesz’s action.80 The court supported its holding that the Marion County township courts were not “judicial districts” under the FDCPA by looking at the organization and administration of the courts.81 One of the factors considered by the court is that
the township courts are not courts of record. The court also noted that plaintiffs could file claims in any township courts and upon a defendant’s objection or request for transfer the judge could transfer the case to any of the
other township courts.82 Further, circuit court judges assisted with the establishment of township court rules, noting that such factors regarding the
structure of the court system of Marion County were similar enough to
those of the Cook County Municipal Department districts at issue in Newsom, that Suesz’s action was dismissed.83

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 734 F.3d 684, 685 (7th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 684-85.
Id. at 685.
Id.
Id.
Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 734 F.3d 684, 685 (7th Cir. 2013).
Id.
Id. at 684.
Id.
Id.
Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 734 F.3d 684, 684 (7th Cir. 2013).
Id.
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The Seventh Circuit, in its analysis, looked specifically to the Indiana
state court structure as established by the Indiana Constitution.84 In Indiana,
in all but one circuit, county lines are the boundaries for the individual circuits.85 Indiana has, through statute, provided for the establishment of other
courts to help relieve the caseload of the circuit courts.86 Such courts include: standard superior courts which handle civil disputes with a value not
to exceed $6,000; city and town courts which handle misdemeanors, ordinance violations, and some small claims disputes; and, unique to Marion
County, there are township courts.87
There are nine statutorily established township courts in Marion County.88 Each of these courts are supported by the individual township that it
serves, including providing the court officials’ salaries and facilities to be
used by the courts.89 With Marion County not having established the standard superior level courts that other Indiana judicial circuits have to handle
small claims cases, these township courts take on that role.90 The township
courts “have original and concurrent jurisdiction over civil actions seeking
up to $6,000, though they are limited in subject matter jurisdiction to contract and tort cases.”91 Individual township courts have county-wide jurisdiction, but if a defendant objected to venue, a township judge could transfer the case to another township court the judge believed to be the preferred
venue for a given claim.92 In contract claims, such as the one at issue in
Suesz, the preferred venue would be “the place where the contract was
signed, followed in priority by the township where the transactions giving
rise to the claim took place, or where the defendants reside or do business.”93
In upholding its decision in Newsom, and applying that holding to
Suesz, the court placed much emphasis on “the lack of territorially-based
limits on the courts’ authority.”94 The township courts, like the municipal
department division courts at issue in Newsom, were not limited to hear
cases that only arose in that given township.95 Thus, filing a claim in a
township court that was not the preferred venue may, upon objection, result
84. Id. at 687.
85. Id. (citing IND. CODE § 33-28-1-2(a)(1)-(2) (2011)).
86. Id. at 687.
87. Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 734 F.3d 684, 687 (7th Cir. 2013).
88. Id.
89. Id. (citing IND. CODE § 33-34-6-1 (2006)).
90. Id.
91. Id. (citing IND. CODE § 33-34-3-2 (2004)).
92. Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 734 F.3d 684, 687 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing IND.
CODE § 33-34-3-1(a) (2004)).
93. Id. at 687-88 (citing IND. CODE § 33-34-3-1(b) (2004)).
94. Id. at 688.
95. Id.
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in the case being transferred.96 However, it would not prevent any township
court from deciding any case that could have been filed in any of the township courts.97 The court concluded that while a case could be properly filed
in any of the township courts, there was also a method in place for transferring the case, upon a defendant’s motion, to the preferred venue for that
claim.98 Therefore, to the majority of the panel deciding Suesz I, the lack of
territorial limits was the paramount reason for the court’s decision that each
of the township courts were not separate “judicial districts” under the
FDCPA.99
Judge Posner wrote a dissent to the Suesz I panel’s majority opinion
challenging the logic of the method of statutory construction used by the
majorities in Newsom and Suesz I, further arguing that the conclusions
reached by those panels’ majorities were contrary to the intended purpose
of the FDCPA.100 This dissenting opinion would foreshadow what was to
come as the Seventh Circuit voted to rehear Suesz en banc.101

III.
A.

SUESZ V. MED-1 SOLUTIONS, LLC EN BANC

MAJORITY OPINION

In rehearing this case, the Seventh Circuit’s majority based its reversal
of the panel’s holding on what it viewed as a common practice of abusive
forum shopping by debt collectors.102 The court was persuaded that it is a
“common tactic for debt collectors . . . to sue in a court that is not convenient to the debtor, as this makes default more likely; or in a court perceived
to be friendly to such claims; or, ideally, in a court having both of these
characteristics.”103 The court additionally noted that because of the relatively low amounts in question in these cases—the Marion County township
courts have a jurisdictional limit of $6,000—it is more likely that defendants will elect to not retain an attorney to defend them in these suits, or to
even bother to defend the suits pro se.104
To begin its analysis, the court first looked to the makeup of the
Township of Marion County Small Claims Courts, rehashing much of what
96. Id.
97. Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 734 F.3d 684, 687-88 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing
IND. CODE § 33-34-3-1(b) (2004)).
98. Id. at 690-91.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 691 (Posner, J., dissenting).
101. Id.
102. Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 757 F.3d 636, 638-39 (7th Cir. 2014).
103. Id. at 639.
104. Id.
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was discussed by the panel.105 However, the court noted that there was a
discrepancy between the state venue statute and Small Claim Rule 12—
which was a result of changes made in 1999 to settle a lawsuit based upon
the Voting Rights Act.106 Prior to 1999, all of the township courts were organized under the Marion Superior Court and venue in these courts was
county-wide for claims other than those arising from landlord tenant disputes.107 Because the process for election of judges under the system that
had been in place led to an underrepresentation of overall population and
racial minorities, the parties in the case settled on a plan that would reorganize the township court system.108 Under this new system, venue was
dependent on township—but cases could still be transferred between township courts if filed in the wrong court.109
The court relied on the report of a task force comprised of two judges
from Indiana’s Court of Appeals that found that most defendants do not
know that they have the ability to have cases transferred from one township
court to another if the case is filed in a court in non-compliance with the
venue rules.110 In these instances, it may be more difficult for defendants to
appear in court in certain townships because of the limitations of the public
transportation system.111 Further, this report expressed concerns that some
debt collectors were filing cases in courts that appeared to be more favorable to “large-volume filers.”112 This report also found that judges who
“have made efforts to review settlement terms, as opposed to judges who
allegedly rubber-stamp settlement agreements, have seen dramatic declines
in new filings in their township courts.”113
The court next looked to the statutory language of “judicial district.”114
Unlike the Court in Newsom that based its interpretation on the plain language of the statute and the composition and structure of the court system at
issue, the court focused its analysis on “the state court venue rules faced by
parties and lawyers, and the relevant geographic unit for applying those
rules.”115
105. Id. at 640.
106. Id. at 640-41; IND. CODE § 33-34-3-1 (2004); IND. R. OF CT. SMALL CL. R. 12.
107. Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 757 F.3d 636, 641 (7th Cir. 2014).
108. Id. at 641-42.
109. Id. at 642.
110. Id. (citing SMALL CLAIMS TASK FORCE, REPORT ON THE MARION COUNTY SMALL
CLAIMS COURTS, 13-14 (2012), www.in.gov/judiciary/files/pubs-smclaims-rept-2012.pdf).
111. Id.
112. Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 757 F.3d 636, 642 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing
SMALL CLAIMS TASK FORCE, REPORT ON THE MARION COUNTY SMALL CLAIMS COURTS, 1314 (2012), www.in.gov/judiciary/files/pubs-smclaims-rept-2012.pdf ).
113. Id. at 642
114. Id. at 642-43.
115. Id. at 643.
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With regard to its analysis of the language of the statute, the court held
that there was no “plain language” meaning of “judicial district.”116 First,
the court determined that the phrase “judicial district” is too vague to attribute a plain language meaning to it.117 The court was not persuaded by the
dictionary definition relied upon by the panel in Newsom:
[O]ne of the circuits or precincts into which a state
is commonly divided for judicial purposes; a court
of general original jurisdiction being usually provided in each of such districts, and the boundaries
of the district marking the territorial limits of its
authority; or the district may include two or more
counties, having separate and independent county
courts, but in that case they are presided over by
the same judge.118
The court cautioned that lawyers and judges should not “overread”
these dictionary definitions, holding that the definition relied upon by the
Newsom panel—specifically with the terms “circuits or precincts,” “commonly divided,” “usually provided,” and “may include,”—are too loose to
be given so much weight in determining the meaning of the FDCPA’s venue provision.119 Further, the court opined that the modifying language “or
similar legal entity” added to the inability to determine the plain language
meaning of the statute based on the Black’s Law Dictionary definition.120
Next, the court refuted the Newsom panel’s “judicial administration
approach”—that the Cook County Circuit Court’s municipal department’s
administration and inner-workings lent itself to being viewed as but one
“judicial district.”121 It was important to the panel in Newsom that the entire
unified Cook County Circuit Court system had “one chief judge and one
administration, and that the boundaries between the municipal department
districts did not set any territorial limits to the legal authority of the courts
sitting in particular districts.”122 The court held that by allowing the administrative policies to be afforded so much weight in determining what a “judicial district” means under the statute, then the purpose of the venue provision—the prevention of abusive forum-shopping—is diminished.123 Moreover, the court held that such a definition would in fact allow debt collectors
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 757 F.3d 636, 643 (7th Cir. 2014).
Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 848 (6th ed. 1990)).
Id. at 643-44.
Id. at 644.
Id. at 645.
Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 757 F.3d 636, 645 (7th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 646.
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to find courts that would be inconvenient to the debtor, or friendly to the
debt collector, regardless of the court’s distance from where the debtor resided, and use that choice of forum as a weapon to attain default judgments.124
The court next pointed out that there are substantial differences in the
administration and composition of the Cook County municipal department
districts and the Marion County township courts.125 Specifically, the court
noted that the nine township courts are “established as separate courts with
separate election districts, administration, staffing, and funding, and even
separate seals, and their separate status and the accompanying venue rules
having been created in order to remedy a problem . . . under the Voting
Rights Act.”126 However, rather than distinguishing Suesz from Newsom,
the court chose to discount these differences, based upon its determination
that these differences do not have anything to do with the purpose that the
FDCPA’s venue provision was intended to accomplish.127 The court also
failed to note that there is a fairly large gap in the jurisdictional amounts
between the Cook and Marion County “small claims” courts. Where the
jurisdictional limit of the township courts in Marion County is limited to
$6,000, the Cook County municipal department districts have a jurisdictional amount that can exceed $100,000.128
Rather than following either of the approaches laid out by the Newsom
panel’s opinion, the court created a different method of analysis for determining what a “judicial district” means under the Act.129 The court called it
the “venue approach” and modeled after the Second Circuit’s Hess opinion.130 Under the “venue approach” “judicial district or similar legal entity”
means the “smallest geographic area that is relevant for determining venue
in the court system in which the case is filed.”131 In doing so, the court reversed the holdings of the panels in both Newsom and Suesz I.
The court next looked to the relationship between federal and state
law.132 The court stated that the federal law takes states as it finds them and
that it was possible to comply with both the state and federal law simultaneously.133 The majority also noted that it was possible to comply with a
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 757 F.3d 636, 646 (7th Cir. 2014).
128. Municipal Department Overview, STATE OF ILL. CIR. CT. OF COOK COUNTY,
http://www.cookcountycourt.org/ABOUTTHECOURT/MunicipalDepartment.aspx
(last
visited Jan. 2, 2015).
129. Suesz, 757 F.3d at 638.
130. Id. at 646.
131. Id. at 638.
132. Id. at 648.
133. Id.
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state’s venue laws but run afoul of the FDCPA’s venue provision.134 This
could occur if a debt collector failed to file a suit in the same “judicial district” as where the debtor resides if the state’s venue laws allow for broader
venue than that authorized by the federal law.135 The court did not believe it
was important to consider the source of the state’s venue rules—whether
created by a standing court order such as was the case in Newsom or by
state statute as was the case in Suesz.136
Interestingly, the court noted that “[t]he jurisdiction of the township
small claims courts over small claims cases is concurrent with the jurisdiction of the county’s circuit and superior courts.”137 However, venue is county-wide in Indiana’s circuit and superior courts.138 Thus, if there are a multiple circuit courts in a given county it seems possible that a case could be
filed in any of those courts and still comply with the FDCPA’s venue provision.139 This exception seems to illustrate the court’s emphasis on these
being low dollar value cases, likely to cause defendants to fail to litigate,
ultimately resulting in a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff.140
B.

SUESZ V. MED-1 SOLUTIONS – JUDGE SYKES CONCURRENCE

Justice Sykes wrote a concurrence to Judge Hamilton’s and Judge
Posner’s majority opinion that agreed with the outcome of the case, but
expressed concerns raised by Justice Flaum’s dissent regarding issues of
federalism that were cursorily glossed over by the majority’s opinion.141
Her agreement with the majority with regard to the holding of the case was
based on the rationale that the majority’s holding should not be viewed as a
venue rule, but as a penalty for debt collectors who fail to abide by the
FDCPA’s venue provision.142
Sykes noted that most consumer debt collection cases are for relatively
small amounts of money, involving state law contract claims, and do not
generally meet the diversity jurisdictional amount-in-controversy requirement of being in more than $75,000.143 She also wrote that she did not be134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 757 F.3d 636, 638 (7th Cir. 2014).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing IND. CODE § 33-34-3-2 (2015)).
Id. at 648.
See Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 757 F.3d 636, 648 (7th Cir. 2014).
See generally id.
Id. at 650-51.
Id. at 651.
Id. at 651 (citing FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM:
PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN DEBT COLLECTION LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION, 6 (2010); FED.
RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., QUARTERLY REPORT ON HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND CREDIT, 15 (Nov.
2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2011)).
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lieve “that Congress has the power to prescribe procedural rules for statelaw claims in state courts.”144 She addressed the fact that there are instances
where federal law may require the state court to abide by certain federal
procedural rules, especially when those federal procedural rules are “part
and parcel” of the federal law claim being decided by the state court. 145
Sykes further noted that occasionally a state’s “procedural rules may be
displaced when they conflict with or unnecessarily burden the substance of
a federal cause of action being litigated in a state court.”146 However, Sykes
indicated that these scenarios seem fairly distinct from a state court using
state procedural rules in the process of adjudicating a purely state law
claim.147
While it appears that Med-1 never raised a constitutional argument to
the statute’s interpretation as decided by the court, Sykes’ concurrence
wrote that it is still important to consider the “background principles of
federalism” in interpreting federal statutes.148 She acknowledged that the
majority’s opinion with regard to this point does little more than summarily
gloss over any objection based on federalism by holding that the court’s
holding “takes state courts as it finds them,” as she stated, in attempt to
“avoid serious constitutional difficulty.”149
C.

JUDGE FLAUM DISSENT

Judge Flaum wrote a dissent criticizing the majority’s decision to
overturn the panel’s decision. This dissent was based primarily upon what
he believed to be a flawed statutory construction analysis employed by the
majority.150 Flaum believed that it was Congress’s intent, by omitting a
definition of “judicial district,” for the definition of the phrase to be based
upon how they are “defined by the government that established the relevant
courts.”151 Under his analysis, since most debt-collection suits are usually
filed in state courts, one should look to how the state has established its
courts and their administrative workings in order to determine at what level

144. Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 757 F.3d 636, 651 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 YALE L.J. 947 (2001);
Wendy E. Parmet, Stealth Preemption: The Proposed Federalization of State Court Procedures, VILL. L. REV. 1 (1999)).
145. Id. (citing Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 363
(1952)).
146. Id. at 651.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 652 (citing Bond v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 2077, 2090 (2014)).
149. Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 757 F.3d 636, 652-53 (7th Cir. 2014).
150. See generally id. at 655-58 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 655 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
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a “judicial district” is formed.152 Thus, Flaum believed that the township
courts in Marion County were not individual “judicial districts,” but subdivisions of the Marion County nineteenth judicial circuit, which he believed
Indiana attempted to define as a single judicial district.153
Flaum then challenged the majority’s position that if Congress had intended to defer to the states’ jurisdictional or venue rules, that §1692i
would be meaningless.154 He first attacked the majority’s contention by
noting that normally if a case is filed in the wrong state court, and venue
was objected to, that the case would be moved and there is no penalty imposed on the party that filed in the wrong venue.155 However, under the
FDCPA, if a plaintiff files in the wrong venue, a defendant can bring a
claim under the FDCPA and the plaintiff may be assessed damages.156 Second, Flaum noted that under some state statutes a plaintiff may be able to
file in a venue in which the debtor works or has other connections—the
FDCPA restricts plaintiffs from doing this even though it may be proper
under the state rules.157
D.

JUDGE KANNE DISSENT

Judge Kanne also wrote a dissenting opinion. He first criticized the
majority for having abandoned what he believed was good law in the Newsom and Suesz I opinions without having a proper basis for doing so.158
Kanne then proceeds to criticize the majority’s process of statutory construction.159 His initial arguments reaffirm his belief that the Newsom and
Suesz I panels were correct in looking to the Black’s law definition for a
plain and natural meaning of the phrase “judicial district.”160 Kanne went on
to emphasize that under the Black’s definition for “judicial district” (circuit
or precinct commonly divided for judicial purpose161) that it is clear that the
Indiana judicial circuits are the circuits commonly divided for judicial purposes.162 Kanne noted that within some of these districts, different counties
152. Id. (Flaum, J., dissenting).
153. Id. (Flaum, J., dissenting) (citing IND. CODE § 33-33-49-2 (2004) (“Marion
County constitutes the nineteenth judicial circuit.”)).
154. Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 757 F.3d 636, 655-56 (7th Cir. 2014) (Flaum,
J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 656 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
156. Id. (Flaum, J., dissenting).
157. Id. (Flaum, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 658 (Kanne, J., dissenting).
159. Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 757 F.3d 636, 659 (7th Cir. 2014) (Kanne, J.,
dissenting).
160. Id. at 660 (Kanne, J., dissenting).
161. See supra text accompanying note 28.
162. Suesz, 757 F.3d at 660 (Kanne, J., dissenting).
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have created additional courts to lighten the dockets of the circuit courts,
but there is not a uniform way that these systems have been structured
throughout Indiana. However, each system operates within one judicial
circuit.163 Thus, to Kanne, “judicial districts” would be individual circuits,
as those are where there is uniformity across Indiana.164 Rather, according
to Kanne, the Marion County township courts are unique to Marion County
and not found in the rest of the state, it therefore cannot be claimed that
those courts are “a common division in the state court system in which they
exist.”165
Kanne then wrote that even if the Black’s definition was unpersuasive
to the majority, that there is another definition that was intended by Congress—that “judicial district” means federal judicial district, and “or similar
legal entity” refers to the corresponding state court level.166
Kanne argued that rather than taking one of these approaches of statutory analysis, the majority seems to have made up their definition of “judicial district” (the “smallest geographic area that is relevant for determining
venue in the court system in which the case is filed”) without any legal justification for having arrived at that definition.167 Rather, it appeared to
Kanne that the majority sought out a definition that they determined would
be the most consistent with their idea of the purpose of the statute, and
while laudable, the sole reliance on legislative intent as a means of altering
the meaning of the statutory language was an impermissible method of resolving ambiguity.168
Following his criticism of the majority’s statutory analysis, Kanne
pointed out some of the practical absurdities that result from the majority’s
approach.169 Again going back to federal judicial districts, Kanne noted that
there are a number of federal districts that are divided into divisions.170 In
some of these divided districts there are local rules that require actions to be
filed within the proper division.171 Under the majority’s rule then, some
federal districts are not “judicial districts” when there are divisions within

163. Id. (Kanne, J., dissenting).
164. Id. (Kanne, J., dissenting).
165. Id. (Kanne, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 661 (Kanne, J., dissenting).
167. Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 757 F.3d 636, 662 (7th Cir. 2014) (Kanne, J.,
dissenting).
168. Id. (Kanne, J., dissenting).
169. Id. (Kanne, J., dissenting).
170. Id. (Kanne, J., dissenting).
171. Id. (Kanne, J., dissenting) (citing e.g., Northern and Southern Districts of Iowa
Local Rule 3(b); District of Montana Local Rule 3.2(b); Western District of Virginia Local
Rule 2(b)).
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one district.172 In this case the divisions would be the “judicial district”
since those are the “smallest geographic area[s] . . . relevant for determining
venue in the court system in which the case is filed.”173 However, if other
federal districts were not so divided they would still then be considered a
“judicial district.”174 Thus, the only way under the majority’s approach to
be able to define federal districts as a “judicial district” would be to analyze
the “details of court administration,” which was the approach espoused by
the Newsom court, but rejected by this majority.175
This approach will also lead to inconsistencies within a given state’s
judicial system according to Kanne. He referenced the Indiana state court
system, specifically the trial court systems, being different from county to
county.176 In other counties that have given superior courts the role of handling small claims cases, of which there may be multiple in one county,
those courts are not viewed as being individual “judicial districts,” but under this analysis viewed as a component of the circuit court. 177 Kanne argues that this is an inconsistent and arbitrary approach because “judicial
district” in Marion County is now defined differently than it is in any other
circuit in the Indiana state court system.178 Kanne posited, “[h]ow can we
define a ‘judicial district’—something which by the nature of the words
themselves must be a division of some larger entity—in a way that is not
consistent with respect to that larger entity?”179
Finally, Kanne noted that if it really was the intent of Congress to take
out of states’ hands the ability to enact venue rules that are fair to debtors,
that this rule is not an adequate one to do so.180 The entirety of the majority’s rule depends on a state’s given venue rules.181 States, if they so desired,
would be able to rewrite venue rules to have venue not depend on geographic boundaries and circumvent this approach.182

172.
dissenting).
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
dissenting).
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
dissenting).

Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 757 F.3d 636, 662 (7th Cir. 2014) (Kanne, J.,
Id. (Kanne, J., dissenting).
Id. (Kanne, J., dissenting).
Id. (Kanne, J., dissenting).
Id. (Kanne, J., dissenting).
Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 757 F.3d 636, 663 (7th Cir. 2014) (Kanne, J.,
Id. (Kanne, J., dissenting).
Id. (Kanne, J., dissenting).
Id. (Kanne, J., dissenting).
Id. (Kanne, J., dissenting).
Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 757 F.3d 636, 663 (7th Cir. 2014) (Kanne, J.,

2016]

SUESZ V. MED-1 SOLUTIONS, LLC

IV.
A.

103

ARGUMENT

STATUTORY ANALYSIS OF § 1692I

I would agree with Judge Kanne that the method of statutory construction employed by the majority in Suesz seems a bit odd and without much
support, especially to overturn what seemed to be a straightforward analysis
under Newsom. When definitions of terms in statutes are not provided by
the legislature, that word is generally construed in accordance with an ordinary or natural plain-language meaning—a legal dictionary is a perfectly
valid means of finding such a meaning.183 While the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of “judicial district” used by the Newsom court is helpful, it
seems as though the possible intended definition mentioned by Judge
Kanne is likely what was intended by Congress.184
It is often said that the simplest explanation is usually the correct one.
Here, it seems that the easiest explanation would be that the Federal Congress used “judicial district” to refer to federal district courts, and “similar
legal entity” to refer to their corresponding state version since not all states
structure or label their trial level courts in the same way. Congress has used
the phrase “judicial district” in statutes and in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in referring to federal district courts.185 According to the United States
Courts website, there are ninety-four federal judicial districts.186 Most importantly for the purpose of this note, Congress used the phrase “judicial
district” frequently in the General Venue statute for United States District
Courts.187 Certainly, when Congress uses the phrase “judicial district” in a
statutory provision dealing with venue, such as § 1692i of the FDCPA, one
cannot help but think that Congress was referring to the same entity that it
referred to in legislation dealing with venue generally in the federal district
courts.188
Thus, it would seem that the definition of “judicial district” is fairly
straight forward, and what would really be left to interpret is what under the
statute constitutes the corresponding “similar legal entity” in a state. In both
Marion County, Indiana and Cook County, Illinois there is one judicial cir183. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993).
184. See Suesz, 757 F.3d 661 (Kanne, J., dissenting).
185. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2011); FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e) (“Unless federal law
provides otherwise, an individual--other than a minor, an incompetent person, or a person
whose waiver has been filed--may be served in a judicial district of the United States . . . .”)
(emphasis added).
186. Court Role and Structure, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federalcourts/court-role-and-structure (last visited Jan. 23, 2016).
187. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2011).
188. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2011), with 15 U.S.C. § 1692i (2014).
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cuit that is comprised of the entire county, but also contains smaller courts
that have been created seemingly for the convenience of litigants and for
the courts as well.189 The majority in Suesz seems to find that the Marion
County Circuit and by reference Cook County Circuit constitute “judicial
districts” under the act.190 These state circuits are the state equivalent of
federal districts. So why then is this not the end of the inquiry? It would
seem as though once a plaintiff has filed an action within a “judicial district” in which the debtor resides—which here would be any court in either
county—that the plaintiff has complied with the statute. As noted by Judge
Kanne, there are federal districts that are divided into divisions, one such
district is the Federal District of Northern Illinois, which has an Eastern and
Western Division.191 Some of these federal districts have local rules specifying which division venue is proper in for certain actions.192 Congress
surely could not have intended to craft a rule that would occasionally cause
some federal districts to not be “judicial districts” while others would be.193
After having determined that, as in this case, the Illinois and Indiana circuit
courts constitute “judicial districts,” it seems bizarre to continue to the inquiry as to whether other courts—located within, and established by that
circuit for convenience—should too be considered separate “judicial districts.”
B.

PRACTICAL INCONSISTENCIES WHEN APPLYING THE RULE TO
ILLINOIS STATE COURTS

The Illinois Constitution provides for judicial circuits as trial courts to
be comprised of one or more counties within the intermediate appellate
level judicial districts.194 There are currently twenty-four judicial circuits in
Illinois; only six of those circuits are entirely comprised of one county—
Cook County being one.195 The remaining circuits are made up of two or
more counties.196 Because of this, there are usually multiple courthouses in

189. IND. CODE § 33-28-1-2(a)(1)-(2) (2011); IND. CODE § 33-34-6-1 (2006); ILL.
CONST. art. VI, § 7; Municipal Department Overview, STATE OF ILL. CIR. CT. OF COOK
COUNTY, http://www.cookcountycourt.org/ABOUTTHECOURT/MunicipalDepartment.aspx
(last visited Jan. 2, 2015).
190. See Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 757 F.3d. 648-49 (7th Cir. 2014).
191. Id. at 662 (Kanne, J., dissenting).
192. Id. (Kanne, J., dissenting).
193. Id. (Kanne, J., dissenting).
194. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 7.
195. Illinois
Circuit
Court
General
Information,
ILL.
COURTS,
http://www.state.il.us/court/CircuitCourt/CCInfoDefault.asp (last visited Jan. 2, 2015).
196. Id.
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a given circuit, one for each county.197 The Illinois venue statute is similar
to the FDCPA requirement in that venue is proper in the county in which
the defendant resides; however, the opinion in Suesz seems to recognize
such state circuits as judicial districts, and if Illinois’ law allowed for
broader venue, a plaintiff would theoretically be able to sue a debtor in any
county within a circuit in which he resided, no matter how far or inconvenient, and still comply with the FDCPA.198
The application of this rule becomes stranger yet in applying it to the
Cook County Municipal Department Districts as compared to the preceding
paragraph. There are six Municipal Departments in Cook County. 199 The
First Municipal District is in Chicago, and the remaining Districts are
spread out amongst the Cook County suburbs.200 While the First Municipal
District is limited to cases involving under $30,000 for civil cases, the rest
of the Municipal Districts can hear cases up to $100,000, and in some instances cases worth amounts in excess of $100,000.201 Further, the other
Municipal Departments can hear other cases that cannot be heard in First
Municipal Department courts such as, felony criminal cases, juvenile justice cases, domestic relations cases, and orders of protection, just to name a
few.202 Thus, the Second through Sixth Municipal Districts function much
more like county courts of general jurisdiction than the First Municipal
District, and certainly more so than the Marion County township courts at
issue in Suesz. These Municipal Departments are more analogous to the
multiple county courts operating within one judicial circuit in Illinois than
they are to courts that function solely for hearing small claims cases not to
exceed $6,000.203 Yet, this rule would allow for venue anywhere within a
multiple-county circuit when not prohibited by state law, but imposes a
penalty for filing a case in the wrong court within a county, even when
permitted by state law, as it is in Illinois.204

197. E.g.,
Circuit
Courts,
ILL.
SECOND
JUD.
CIR.
CT.,
http://illinoissecondcircuit.info/circuit-courts (last visited Mar. 5, 2015).
198. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-101 (West 2012). See Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions,
LLC, 757 F.3d. 636, 648-49 (7th Cir. 2014).
199. Municipal Department Overview, STATE OF ILL. CIR. CT. OF COOK COUNTY,
http://www.cookcountycourt.org/ABOUTTHECOURT/MunicipalDepartment.aspx
(last
visited Jan. 2, 2015).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.; IND. CODE ANN. § 33-34-3-2 (West 2015).
204. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-101 (West 2012). See Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions,
LLC, 757 F.3d. 636, 648-49 (7th Cir. 2014).
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It is true that Cook County rules provide that actions should be filed in
the department district in which a defendant resides.205 But, as noted by the
Newsom court, any case can be transferred upon a defendant’s objection,
and any case can be heard by any judge in any district regardless of where
the action was filed—which would lead one to believe that there was a deliberate intention to leave discretion with the trial courts.206 These rules and
procedures drastically differ from the scenario in Hess.207 As recognized by
the Second Circuit in distinguishing Hess from Newsom, the Syracuse City
Court set territorial limits on its ability to hear a case based upon the defendant’s contacts with the jurisdiction.208 The Second Circuit was of the
opinion that the Cook County Municipal Department Districts did not set
territorial boundaries, because of General Order 1.3.209
C.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SUESZ RULE

I am in agreement with the concurring and dissenting opinions in
Suesz, that this rule espoused by the Suesz majority, that a penalty can be
imposed on debt collectors under the FDCPA who file state court actions in
state courts where venue is proper, is likely unconstitutional as a violation
of the Tenth Amendment.210 This issue, however, seems to be a fairly novel
one with regard to the Tenth Amendment, as this rule, and the statute itself,
do not mandate that a state or any of its actors actually do anything to comply with it.211 Rather, this rule infringes on the traditional notion of state
sovereignty in enacting its own procedural rules for state causes of action
by imposing penalties on plaintiffs operating in those state court systems,
even when abiding by the state’s procedural rules.212
“The general rule, bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of state
control of state judicial procedure, is that federal law takes the state courts
as it finds them.”213 While the Suesz majority cites this, it is not entirely
clear how the rule it has put forward is consistent with that statement. While
the rule does leave the state procedural rules in place, it in effect alters the

205. GEN. ORDER OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK CTY., MUN. DEP’T, 1.2, 2.3(d)(1)
(1996).
206. Id. at 1.3(a) ; Newsom v. Friedman, 76 F.3d 813, 819 (7th Cir. 1996).
207. Hess v. Cohen & Slamowitz, LLP, 637 F.3d 117, 119 (2d Cir. 2011).
208. Id.
209. See id.
210. Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 757 F.3d. 636, 653-54 (7th Cir. 2014) (Sykes,
J., concurring).
211. See id. at 638.
212. See id.
213. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM.
L. REV. 489, 508 (1954).
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rules for those who operate within the state court system, and do not wish to
provide their debtors a cause of action under the FDCPA.
The two most notable Tenth Amendment cases are New York v. United
States, and Printz v. United States. In New York, the Court declared unconstitutional a federal act that could force states to take title of low-level radioactive waste.214 Justice O’Connor wrote the majority opinion and noted
that the federal government could not “commandeer the legislative processes of the States” by forcing the states to enforce a given federal regulatory
program.215
In Printz, the federal statute at issue was one that attempted to compel
certain law officers to perform background checks in concert with the sale
of handguns.216 Writing for the majority, and holding the act to be unconstitutional, Justice Scalia emphasized the concept of dual sovereignty.217
While states had given up many of their rights to the federal government,
“residual and inviolable sovereignty” remains.218
While New York and Printz do differ from the issue at hand in that
those federal laws expressly and directly attempted to make states and state
actors comply with federal regulation, the ratio decidendi from these cases
is very applicable to this issue.219 This rule could certainly be viewed as an
indirect attempt to commandeer the states’ procedural law-making ability.
If Congress was to enact procedural rules applicable to the states that were
narrower than the states wished to write those laws, then state legislatures
would be powerless to tweak the procedural laws of its state to fit the
unique realities of that state. It also seems to me that one of the fundamental
sovereign rights of a state is to create procedural law for actions arising
under its laws and being heard in its courts. It has been argued, “Congress
has no authority to regulate state court procedures in state law cases because ‘procedural law’ derives exclusively from state authority.”220
It is well settled that federal district courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction will apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.221 However, the Court has not yet specifically addressed to what extent Congress has
214. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
215. Id. at 161 (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn.,, 452 U.S.
264, 288 (1981)).
216. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
217. Id. at 918.
218. Id. at 919.
219. See New York, 505 U.S. at 161. See also Printz, 521 U.S. at 918-19.
220. Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 YALE
L.J. 947, 972 (2001).
221. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (a federal district court sitting
in diversity jurisdiction will apply state substantive law); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,
466-67 (1965) (federal district courts sitting in diversity will apply federal procedural law).
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authority over state procedural law in state court cases.222 State courts in
adjudicating some federal claims are bound to follow federal procedural
law when that procedure is deemed to be a fundamental aspect of the federal cause of action.223 This point illustrates that there are instances where
procedural and substantive law are so closely entwined that the procedure
used may likely affect the outcome of a case.224 Because of this relationship
allowing the federal government to begin meddling with state court procedures in state law cases in this manner will ultimately lead to procedural
and substantive irregularities.225

V. CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit majority in Suesz II certainly had a laudable goal
in promulgating this rule as an attempt to help those who are already less
fortunate. Their solution however, I am afraid has the potential of doing
more harm than good. Although this rule, in and of itself may seem harmless, I would argue that to allow the federal government to start making its
own procedural rules for state law actions in certain types of cases here and
there would inevitably lead to a very confusing and troubling end.
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